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This study examines the level of unsecured borrowing done by the firms that would ultimately
rescue Long-Term Capital Management in the days leading up to the hedge fund’s rescue.
Although there is some evidence that these banks borrowed less at the height of the crisis, further
examination reveals that this reduction in borrowing was demand-driven and did not result from
rationing on the part of the market. This suggests that the market believed that the troubles at
LTCM would not have solvency-threatening repercussions for the fund’s major creditors. Further,
it is shown that large banks that were not involved with the LTCM rescue saw the rates they pay
for unsecured funds decline following the hedge fund’s resolution. This finding is consistent with
an increase in the perceived strength of a too-big-to-fail policy.
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1. Introduction
The events surrounding the trouble experienced by Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) and its eventual rescue were portrayed, as they were happening, as a serious threat to
the health of the US economy. As is well known, the Federal Reserve played a key role in
organizing and hosting meetings between LTCM and the institutions that would ultimately
rescue the troubled hedge fund. In justifying Fed involvement in the resolution, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York President William J. McDonough said, “The abrupt and disorderly closeout
of Long-Term Capital’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the US economy”
(McDonough (1998), p. 1051). This quote emphasizes that much of what was driving the Fed’s
involvement with LTCM was the uncertainty regarding the consequences of doing the
alternative, namely letting the fund collapse and having its financial contracts unwound in a
forced liquidation. Because it was difficult to know what might have happened in the absence of
Fed involvement, policymakers chose to facilitate a resolution that allowed the hedge fund’s
financial contracts to be closed out in an orderly fashion. One important consequence of the
Fed’s choice was that it avoided potentially excessive financial hardship or possibly the failure of
major commercial and investment banks.
 After the fact, it is difficult to determine whether or not the Fed’s decision to intervene
was a good one because one can only directly observe the benefits of the action (orderly
resolution and no major bank failures) but not the costs. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to
provide some evidence on the magnitude of the benefits and costs of the Fed’s action. To do so,
we will focus on a set of nine large commercial banks that ultimately were part of the group of
14 institutions that jointly rescued LTCM. The paper will refer to these institutions as the major
bank “creditors” of LTCM, although the term creditors should be interpreted broadly. While it is2
presumed that these institutions would have experienced significant losses had LTCM not been
resolved in an orderly manner, these potential losses need not have arisen from direct credit
exposures to LTCM. Rather, it could have been the case that these institutions were holding
proprietary trading positions similar to those of the hedge fund, thereby making them similarly
exposed to market movements that might follow a forced liquidation of LTCM.
To shed light on the magnitude of the benefits of Fed involvement, the paper will examine
whether financial markets thought that the troubled hedge fund would cause the failure of or
major distress to other financial institutions. In particular, the paper will examine the level of
unsecured overnight borrowing done by these nine institutions as an indication of whether the
market believed that these banks had a significant risk of insolvency during September 1998. If
markets believed that the solvency of these nine institutions was in doubt, then these institutions
should have had trouble borrowing large quantities of unsecured funding overnight.
1
To consider the potential costs of Fed involvement, we look for evidence that might
suggest that the safety net was expanded by the Fed’s involvement with LTCM. For example, if
the market interpreted Fed intervention as a strengthening of an implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
policy, then one might expect large banks that were not creditors of LTCM to have been viewed
as an implicitly safer counterparty after the resolution relative to before the crisis. The ability of
such institutions to borrow at more favorable terms following the resolution of LTCM would be
evidence in support of this notion. To address this question, we examine the rates paid by large
banks that were not exposed to LTCM before and after the hedge fund’s resolution.
                                                     
1 Implicitly, the empirical tests are a joint test of the market’s belief that LTCM would cause a creditor bank to fail
and that policymakers would allow these creditor banks to fail. Too-big-to-fail issues are discussed more fully in
later sections.3
Analysis of data from the unsecured, overnight federal funds market delivers the following
empirical results. First, the nine large commercial bank counterparties to LTCM reduced their
borrowing of overnight, unsecured funds during the last days of the crisis period. However, it is
shown that this reduction was accompanied by an increase in the gross level of overnight lending
done by these same institutions. These two findings jointly suggest that the nine banks were
voluntarily reducing their net borrowing of overnight funds rather than being rationed from the
market. The lack of rationing, in turn, implies that market participants were not overly worried
about the solvency of these institutions. Second, the paper finds that large and complex US
commercial banks that were not exposed to LTCM paid lower interest rates to borrow overnight,
unsecured money after the hedge fund’s rescue than they did before the crisis began to unfold.
One interpretation of this finding is that the market has viewed the Fed’s action as an
enhancement of TBTF.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the benefits and costs of the LTCM
rescue. Section 3 briefly reviews what the literature has concluded about the LTCM episode.
Section 4 describes the data used in the study. The empirical results regarding the market’s view
of the solvency of the LTCM creditor banks are given in Section 5. Section 6 provides some
evidence on the potential costs of Fed intervention. Section 7 concludes.
2. Benefits and costs
On September 23, 1998 it was announced that a consortium of 14 large financial
institutions had come to the collective rescue of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.
Further, this rescue was facilitated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York through its
provision of “good offices” (Greenspan (1998), p. 1048). Barring such a rescue, it was feared4
that the forced liquidation of the heavily leveraged hedge fund would lead to large losses at many
of the world’s largest commercial and investment banks. Further, these losses might cause these
institutions to begin unwinding financial positions and liquidating collateral that could, in turn,
lead to unpredictable and possibly severe price movements and extensive financial losses at a
much broader set of financial institutions. In explaining the Fed’s role in testimony to Congress,
Fed Chair Alan Greenspan said, “... there is no reason for central bank involvement unless there
is a substantial probability that a fire sale would result in severe, widespread, and prolonged
disruptions to financial market activity” (Greenspan (1998), p. 1047). Federal Reserve Bank of
New York President William McDonough supported Greenspan’s position by arguing in similar
Congressional testimony, “... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate
markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of
one or more days and maybe longer” (McDonough (1998), p. 1052).
In addition to the views expressed by Fed policymakers, other observers have portrayed the
Fed’s role as the action of a risk-averse central bank hoping to avoid unpredictable and
potentially solvency-threatening losses at major financial institutions. As Edwards (1999) argues,
“Perhaps the more honest case for Fed intervention in LTCM would not
pretend that the Fed was merely an interested bystander, but would
simply argue that it was the best way for regulators to intervene ... had
LTCM not been rescued, and had the solvency of banks and securities
firms been threatened due to a fire sale liquidation of LTCM’s positions,
then regulators would have to decide between relaxing capital standards
[and] forcing the closure or re-capitalization of some large institutions”
(Edwards (1999), p. 204).5
Overall, then, the possible benefits of Fed intervention have at least two dimensions. First, such
policymaker action would limit the market disruption arising from a forced liquidation of LTCM.
Second, Fed intervention would prevent the failure of any major commercial or investment bank,
thereby avoiding the disruptions to economic activity that such a failure might cause.
With regard to the costs of the Fed’s role in the LTCM resolution, some have argued that
facilitating a private sector rescue of a failing hedge fund was “too-big-to-fail” in disguise. In
other words, since the Fed’s action prevented major commercial and investment banks from
having to pay the full costs of a market-imposed failure of LTCM, the central bank may have set
a damaging precedent that implicitly extends the safety net. With regard to this possibility, the
Fed has consistently argued that the costs of its actions were not likely to be severe. McDonough
emphasized to Congress, “… no Federal Reserve official pressured anyone, and no promises
were made. Not one penny of public money was spent or committed” (McDonough (1998), p.
1053). Policymakers, however, did not claim that their actions could be taken without regard for
the potential impact on the safety net. As Greenspan concluded, “We do not have the choice of
accepting the benefits of the current system [of a wide safety net] without its costs” (Greenspan
(1998), p. 1050). As Edwards (1999) explains the issue,
“… quickly bailing out creditors and investors makes markets more
fragile in the long-run, so that when a market fracture occurs, it becomes
even more difficult to contain the damage … [however] … [r]egulators
have an obvious bias to intervene to prevent real and imagined crises on
their watch, even if the long-term consequences pile up because of greater
risk-taking” (Edwards (1999), p. 203).6
The previous discussion documents both the benefits and costs of Fed involvement in the
LTCM rescue. In what follows, the market’s perception of one of the benefits, namely
preventing the failure of major financial institutions, is examined. The conclusion reached, that
the solvency of the major LTCM creditors was never in serious doubt, is in part already
understood. In particular, months after the rescue, Fed Governor Laurence Meyer reported to
Congress on the Fed’s review of supervisory practices following the LTCM incident and stated,
“Our reviews indicated and the financial results indicate that, while the LTCM incident and other
episodes over the past two years may have significantly impacted earnings, they did not threaten
the solvency of any U.S. commercial banking institution” (Meyer (1999), p. 317). What is novel
about this paper, however, is that one can glean from the data what the market’s perception of
the LTCM banks’ insolvency risk was at the time that the crisis was developing. Thus, the
findings could conceivably have been an input to any policymaker decision. Further, the finding
that the LTCM resolution might have been interpreted as an extension of the safety net suggests
that the Fed’s action may not have been costless, despite not directly involving any public
money.
3. Previous studies
With the exception of numerous press accounts and public statements by various Fed
officials, there has been relatively little work related to the events surrounding the collapse of
LTCM. In general, studies of this episode are hindered by the lack of publicly available
information on the trading positions taken by LTCM and other institutions. Of the few academic
analyses of the LTCM episode, Scholes (2000) and Jorion (2000) both discuss the lessons for
modern risk management practices. Being involved with LTCM, it is not surprising that Scholes7
(2000) concludes that failures in the hedge fund’s sophisticated value-at-risk (VaR) models were
not the cause of the fund’s demise. Rather, he believes the main lesson to be drawn is that
policymakers and firms should rely more heavily on stress testing to ascertain vulnerabilities to
potential crises. Jorion (2000), while agreeing with Scholes that VaR approaches to risk
management are not inherently flawed, does take issue with how the hedge fund applied this
methodology. He shows that the method by which LTCM used VaR, namely optimizing
portfolios subject to a VaR constraint, leads to potentially significant biases in the estimation of
portfolio risk. Further, he stresses that LTCM made faulty assumptions with regard to portfolio
correlations, arguing persuasively that many of LTCM’s supposedly uncorrelated positions were
uniformly exposed to the risk of a generalized flight to liquidity. Thus, the blame for LTCM’s
demise lies not in the VaR methodology, but rather in its implementation.
2
With regard to the potential costs of Fed intervention, Edwards (1999), in a qualitative
discussion of the LTCM crisis, argues that the Fed’s intervention in the LTCM episode will
“probably not” expand the safety net (Edwards (1999), p. 204). He further provides a useful
background to the LTCM episode by documenting the growing significance of hedge funds and
the events that led to LTCM’s demise. Edwards also notes that the Fed could have used
traditional lender of last resort facilities to address the hedge fund’s problems rather than provide
“good offices.”
Of particular relevance to this paper is a recent study by Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000). These
authors document an economically large and statistically significant decline in the equity price of
the firms that would ultimately participate in the bailout of LTCM on or about September 2,
when it first became public that LTCM had suffered very large losses in the month of August.
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Such a decline in equity prices did not occur in large banks that did not ultimately participate in
the LTCM rescue. This result leads the authors to conclude that “... the market was perfectly
capable of distinguishing between banks that were at risk and those that were not three weeks
before the rescue” (Kho et. al. (2000), p. 7). Thus, their evidence runs counter to the claim that it
was nearly impossible to know exactly who would be most affected by a forced liquidation if one
were to have occurred.
4. The role of the federal funds market and data construction
In this paper, we use data on the unsecured federal funds market. Before explaining how
the data were constructed, it is useful to explain the general role of overnight money markets in
the day-to-day management of financial institutions. Banks use overnight money markets as their
marginal source and use of funds. For instance, a bank that has excess funds may find it
beneficial to lend to another institution overnight. This lending can be done against collateral, in
which case this transaction is deemed a reverse repurchase (repo) agreement. Alternatively, the
loan can be unsecured. Depending on the method by which the money is transferred, this loan of
unsecured overnight money may be a federal funds transaction. Conversely, a bank may find
itself short of funds one day. Such a bank might therefore increase its overnight borrowing and,
again, the most common approaches would be to enter into a repo transaction or to borrow
unsecured.
Nearly all unsecured overnight borrowing between US commercial banks is settled (i.e. the
money is delivered) using Fedwire, the large-value transfer system owned and operated by the
                                                                                                                                                                          
emphasizes the lack of proper risk management on the part of the banks that had relationships with LTCM.9
Federal Reserve, and thus these loans have become known as federal funds transactions.
3 These
unsecured loans form the basis of the analysis conducted in the following two sections. To
identify individual transactions, data on every payment transferred across Fedwire during 1998
were collected.
4 Each payment identifies, among other items, the sending and the receiving bank
and the amount, in dollars and cents. Only a relatively small number of the approximately
375,000 Fedwire payments each day are either the delivery or the repayment of a federal funds
loan. Stigum (1990) states that federal funds transactions are typically in round lots and are at
least $1 million in value. Therefore, Fedwire payments that were at least $1 million and ended in
five zeros (seven including cents) were identified as candidates for federal funds being delivered.
On average, 15,000 payments per day satisfied this initial criterion. Then, for each of these
possible deliveries, the following day’s payments were searched for a payment between the same
two banks in the opposite direction in an amount that could reasonably be construed as the initial
payment plus interest. Interest rates were restricted to range between 50 basis points below the
minimum and 50 basis points above the maximum rates witnessed by the federal funds brokers
surveyed each day by the Fed.
Pairs of payments on adjoining business days satisfying these search criteria were
identified as a federal funds transaction. For example, if the Fedwire transaction data contain a
payment from Bank A to Bank B for $10 million on Tuesday and also a payment from Bank B to
Bank A for $10,001,527.78 on Wednesday, then this was identified as a federal funds loan of
                                                     
3 Respondents may also lend money unsecured and overnight to their correspondent bank, but these transactions are
processed as accounting entries on the books of the banks and therefore do not involve Fedwire.
4 The Fedwire system distinguishes between payments made on the “funds” system from those made on the “book
entry” system. The funds system tracks payments that are not contingent upon any other payment. This system will
include both the delivery and the repayment of federal funds transactions. The book-entry system records payments
made at the same time as a security is being delivered. Thus, the book-entry system would track the funds transfer
end of repurchase agreements on securities eligible for Fedwire settlement. The data in this study come from
Fedwire funds payments and therefore will not include the funding leg of a repo transaction.10
$10 million from Bank A to Bank B on Tuesday at an interest rate of 5.50%.
5 This process
identified 781,675 transactions over the 252 business days.
6 Based on the information contained
in the underlying Fedwire payments, each transaction identifies the borrowing bank, the lending
bank, the amount of the loan, and (implicitly) the interest rate charged.
Economic theory suggests that riskier financial institutions should pay higher interest rates
when they borrow money. Furfine (2001) documents that this holds true in practice in the
overnight federal funds market. However, if a bank is perceived to be at any significant risk of
failure, it becomes more likely that it will find itself rationed from borrowing in overnight,
unsecured markets rather than simply forced to pay a higher rate of interest. A simple example
illustrates this point. Suppose a bank is perceived to have a 1% chance of defaulting on a one-
year obligation. Assuming risk neutrality implies that the bank will pay interest at a rate 1%
higher than the risk-free rate for unsecured money.
7 Suppose, by contrast, that it is perceived that
a bank has a 1% chance of defaulting on a one-day obligation. The 1% overnight default risk
leads to an interest rate risk premium of 3,678% when expressed at an annual rate.
8 Such huge
risk premiums do not exist in overnight money markets as potential lenders choose simply to
refrain from lending unsecured to institutions with any appreciable probability of default. Simply
stated, markets are generally only willing to lend unsecured when the borrower has a relatively
small probability of default. Thus, two federal funds borrowers with slightly different, yet small
default risks will pay slightly different interest rates. A third borrower, which has a noticeably
higher probability of default, will find it difficult to attract funds at any rate of interest.
                                                     
5 Federal funds transactions are quoted on a discount yield basis.
6 By design, this search approach only identifies overnight transactions. However, according to a Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (1987) survey, overnight transactions account for 96% of the funds market.
7 Implicit in this calculation is a 100% loss given default.
8 Calculated as (1.01)
365 – 1.11
To obtain an indication of how high default risk must go before quantity rationing sets in,
Figure 1 graphs the distribution of interest rate premiums paid by all institutions that borrowed in
the funds market at least once during the first half of 1998. A bank’s premium is defined as the
volume-weighted average of the difference between the interest rate paid less the daily effective
funds rate.
9 As indicated by the white boxes, spreads cover a range of more than 100 basis
points. However, banks that were either big or complex are captured virtually completely within
20 basis points, and banks that ultimately participated in the rescue of LTCM, on average, all
paid between 0 and 10 basis points above the effective rate for funds borrowed during the first
half of 1998. Thus, if one of the creditors of LTCM was willing to pay interest at a rate much
higher than 10 basis points above the effective rate, this could have the effect of signaling to the
market that the institution was in serious difficulty. As an illustration, suppose that an LTCM
creditor might pay 25 basis points above its normal rate for overnight funds before withdrawing
from the market.
10 This additional risk premium compensates lenders for an increase in overnight
default risk of 1 in 144,000.
11
The relationship between the level of default risk and whether a bank pays a higher rate of
interest or is quantity-rationed has implications for the methodology employed in the following
two sections. When examining the borrowing of LTCM creditor banks in the days leading up to
the LTCM rescue, what is of interest is the market’s perception of whether overnight default
                                                     
9 The daily effective funds rate is the volume-weighted average of all funds traded in this market that were brokered
by the set of firms surveyed each day by the Federal Reserve.
10 25 basis points may be a reasonable estimate of how much a bank could reasonably be expected to pay relative to
its peers before being rationed from the market. For instance, during the height of the fears regarding Continental
Illinois, Ellis and Flannery (1992) note that Continental failed to report offering rates for its uninsured CDs between
May 16 and October 3, 1984, signaling that no interest rate would compensate potential lenders for the non-trivial
risk of default. In the two weeks immediately prior to its absence from this market, the rates offered by Continental
Illinois were, on average, 25.9 basis points above the average rate offered by other large banks.
11 Calculated as (0.0025/360).12
probabilities became non-trivial. Thus, it is appropriate to focus on the quantities borrowed by
the LTCM creditors rather than the interest rates that these institutions were paying. By contrast,
when examining the aftermath of the LTCM episode to examine whether there was an increase
in the strength of a TBTF policy, one is interested to know whether the markets believed that a
small decrease had occurred in certain banks’ probability of default. Thus, it is appropriate to
focus on the interest rates paid by institutions potentially made better off by the resolution.
5. Evidence from before the resolution
5.1 The empirical model
The hypothesis to be tested in this section is whether participants in the federal funds
market rationed the major creditors of LTCM in the days leading up to the hedge fund’s rescue.
To examine this question empirically, one must specify who the major creditors are. Following
Kho et. al. (2000), this paper assumes that the 14 institutions that later agreed to rescue the hedge
fund were the major creditors.
12 Of the 14, however, four (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) are investment banks. As such, these institutions do not
have accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank and therefore the overnight funding of these institutions
is not included in the data constructed. Of the remaining 10 institutions, only nine participate
directly in the overnight federal funds market and can be identified in the data.
To detect differences between borrowing levels immediately before the resolution and
those during normal periods, it was required to limit the sample to institutions with enough
presence in the funds market to construe what “normal” levels were. Defining the first six
months of 1998 as the “normal” period, the sample was trimmed to comprise active market13
participants, chosen as those institutions that borrowed funds at least three out of every four days
during the 126 business days of the first half of 1998. This selection criterion identified 164
institutions, including all nine LTCM commercial bank creditors.
It is not possible to use the level of a bank’s daily borrowing as the dependent variable in a
regression analysis. As Table 1 indicates, the banks in the sample have notably different typical
levels of activity in the federal funds market. For instance, the largest borrowing total on a single
day for a single bank was nearly $30 billion, yet the mean borrowing level for a typical active
market participant is only $369 million. To control for the dramatic differences in borrowing
levels across banks in the sample, a modified z-score measure of bank i’s borrowing of overnight
federal funds on day t,  it zb , was constructed as follows. The mean and standard deviation of a
bank’s borrowing during the first half of 1998 was calculated for each of the 164 institutions.
Then,  it zb  was defined as a bank’s observed borrowing less the bank’s mean borrowing divided
by the bank’s standard deviation of borrowing. Note that the mean and standard deviations were
calculated using data from January 1 to June 30, 1998 only. Thus,  it zb  measures the number of
standard deviations that a given bank’s borrowing is away from its normal level. This
transformed variable was comparably distributed across institutions, leading to a more
meaningful basis of comparison in the statistical analysis. After this calculation,  it zb  served as
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12 Also following Kho et. al. (2000), the paper includes Citibank as a creditor institution since its pending merger
with Travelers had been announced.14
The variable  tj period  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if date t is in period j. The
sample period of 1998 was divided into six subperiods. The first period, from January 1 to June
30, is the benchmark period, and thus the analysis assumes that observations from this part of the
year accurately reflect the norm. Periods 2 to 5 are various non-overlapping subperiods of 1998
beginning on July 1 and continuing until September 23, the day when the rescue of LTCM was
announced. Because the interest in this section is studying funds market activity prior to the
rescue of LTCM, the sixth and final period, from September 24 to the end of 1998, is not
included in this regression.
Subperiods 2 to 5 were chosen in an attempt to control for other events occurring during
the same approximate time period.
13 More precisely, the second period was chosen to run from
July 1 to August 16, and therefore covers the period just before the announcement that Russia
would default on its government debt. The third period stretches from the Russian debt
announcement to September 1, the day before it became public that LTCM had suffered
tremendous losses for the month of August. The fourth period extends from the public awareness
of LTCM troubles until September 17, the day before it became known in the market that the
Federal Reserve was directly involved with the troubles surrounding the hedge fund. The fifth
period goes from September 18, the day the Fed became involved, until September 23, the day
the rescue was announced (after the market closed). This period is considered separately to
control for the possibility that knowledge of Fed involvement might have conveyed new
information to the market. Finally, the sixth period, from September 24 until the end of 1998,
represents the “aftermath.” This period will be the focus of Section 6.
                                                     
13 Bank for International Settlements (1999b) provides an international perspective of how the LTCM episode was
but one of many unsettling events that occurred in the autumn of 1998.15
The variables of primary interest are the period dummy variables interacted with the
variable LTCM, which is defined to equal 1 whenever the borrowing bank is one of the nine
creditors of LTCM. The regressions also included four control variables in order to isolate the
impact of being an LTCM creditor. The first control is the variable Big, which was defined to
equal 1 when the borrowing institution, in terms of December 1998 worldwide total assets, was
at least as big as the smallest of the LTCM creditor banks. This threshold identified 24 of the 164
institutions. This variable allows one to distinguish between effects common to the LTCM
creditors and those common to all very large institutions. Analogous to wanting to control for
bank size, one might also wish to control for bank complexity. The variable LCBO was defined
to equal 1 if the borrowing bank was one of the 32 commercial banks identified in a recent
Federal Reserve staff study as “large, complex banking organizations” (Federal Reserve (1999),
p. 28).
14,15
Another control variable attempts to control for another major event that occurred at
approximately the same time, specifically the default on Russian bonds. According to the Bank
for International Settlements (1999c), the banks most heavily exposed to Russia during the latter
part of 1998 were those in Germany. As bank level exposures to Russia were not available for
the sample of 164 institutions, the paper attempts to control for the possible impact of the
Russian default both by using various subperiods and by including a control variable Germany,
                                                     
14 As the term suggests, these are not simply the 32 largest banks in the United States. The designation takes into
account the bank’s level of complexity. The smallest of the 32 LCBOs is the 46th largest bank in terms of year-end
1998 total assets.
15 Because the designations “LTCM”, “Big,” and “LCBO” are correlated, it is helpful to clarify their differences.
First and foremost, note that, by definition, all nine LTCM banks are also classified as Big. Conversely, of the 24
Big institutions, nine are LTCM banks and six are LCBOs. Relatively few of the Big institutions are LCBOs
because most of the Big institutions are foreign and the LCBO designation is only for US banks. Of the 32 LCBOs,
only four are LTCM banks. Only six of the 32 LCBOs are large enough to be considered Big.16
which is equal to 1 if the particular institution was headquartered in Germany. Five of the 164
institutions in the sample were based in Germany.
A final variable controls for the possibility that the nine LTCM creditor banks may be
more or less risky than the typical federal funds borrower. That is, banks might have refrained
from lending to the LTCM creditors during the crisis period not because they were creditors of
LTCM but because uncertain periods lead to a retrenchment away from riskier borrowers in
general. The risk of an institution in this market can be proxied by the rates paid by a bank for
overnight funds relative to what the market was paying. To be precise, interest rate spreads for
each bank on each day were calculated as the difference between a bank’s actual volume-
weighted average rate paid for funds and that day’s effective federal funds rate. The average of
this daily interest rate spread for each institution during the baseline period of January-June 1998
was defined as the control variable Risk.
5.2 Results
The first column of Table 2 reports the results of this regression. For the first three crisis
subperiods, the level of borrowing done by the nine LTCM creditors was not statistically
different from normal times. Once the Fed became involved with the resolution, however, the
borrowing by these nine institutions was lower by 0.42 standard deviations, a finding that is
statistically significant at a 15% level of confidence. By contrast, the coefficient for large banks
during this period indicates a highly significant increase in borrowing of 0.53 standard
deviations. Recalling that all the LTCM banks are also defined as being Big, these two
coefficients indicate that large banks that were unexposed to LTCM borrowed significantly more
during this period relative to the typical bank. Those with LTCM exposures did not.17
The regression results also indicate that German banks had relatively high levels of
borrowing following the Russian default and prior to Fed involvement with LTCM. Complex
banks also increased their borrowing during the first three crisis subperiods. The results further
indicate that riskier institutions tended to borrow less during the second half of 1998, consistent
with a flight from risk in this market. The magnitude of this effect increased as the crisis
continued.
The results reported in the first column of Table 2 for the nine LTCM banks document that,
relative to other very large institutions, the nine creditors of LTCM had lower levels of
borrowing after the Fed became involved with the resolution. One possible explanation of this
finding is that participants in the overnight money market believed that the LTCM creditors had
a serious chance of default. As a result, the market’s willingness to supply funds to the LTCM
creditors fell, causing the LTCM banks to be unable to increase their borrowing levels to the
same extent as other large banks. Alternatively, the finding that the LTCM creditors did not
borrow as much as other large institutions might indicate that these institutions had a relatively
lower demand for funds.
Before understanding how empirical analysis can distinguish between these two alternative
explanations, it is necessary to discuss an important institutional feature about the federal funds
market. In particular, the largest borrowers, among them the LTCM creditors, are also the largest
lenders. That is, major market participants not only use federal funds as their own marginal
source and use of overnight money, they also serve as dealers in the market, both buying funds
from and selling funds to smaller bank counterparties. Thus, one can conduct similar analysis
regarding the level of bank selling during the time period. The intuition is that a bank that finds
itself unable to borrow as much as it wishes would probably reduce the funds that it was18
simultaneously selling. By doing so, the bank could hope to preserve its net level of borrowing
(e.g. the difference between its gross borrowing and gross lending). Presumably, banks that were
finding themselves rationed would be interested in maintaining their prior levels of net
borrowing, for it is net borrowing that measures a bank’s true economic level of overnight
unsecured borrowing that ultimately can be used to fund investment activities.
Thus, the ability to observe a bank’s lending in addition to its borrowing helps one to
distinguish whether the lower level of borrowing done by the LTCM banks was the result of
market rationing (e.g. supply-induced) or intentional (e.g. demand-induced). The second and
third columns of Table 2 report the results from analogous regressions, only replacing the
dependent variable with the modified z-score of the gross level of lending and the net level of
borrowing, respectively. As these results indicate, the nine LTCM banks were the only category
of active market participant that increased its gross funds lent relative to the market in the days
immediately before the resolution. The increase in funds lent combined with these banks’ lower
level of borrowing to generate a 0.61 standard deviation decline in the level of net borrowing
done by the LTCM banks. Overall, these results suggest that the lower level of borrowing by
LTCM banks during the days immediately before the crisis was intentional. That is, since the
LTCM banks did not attempt to maintain their net borrowing levels by reducing their gross funds
lent, the results are not consistent with the market rationing these institutions.
Further support for this conclusion comes from the final two columns of Table 2. These
columns report the results from the same regression analysis, with the average interest rate paid
for funds borrowed and the average interest rate received for funds lent used as the dependent
variable, respectively. In the final days before the resolution, there was no change in the interest
rate paid by the LTCM creditors for borrowed funds but a 4.56 basis point reduction in the19
average rate received for funds lent by these same institutions (significant at the 6% level). These
findings are consistent with the notion that the LTCM creditors wanted to increase their
interbank lending during this time period and were willing to sacrifice nearly 5 basis points,
relative to what was being received by other large banks, to do so.
5.3 Robustness
The previous results suggest that the LTCM banks did not offset declines in gross
borrowing by reducing their gross lending in order to maintain their net level of borrowing.
Although suggesting that there was no rationing on the part of the market, these findings do not
preclude some rationing, nor do they consider the potentially important role that a too-big-to-fail
policy may have on the market’s willingness to lend to banks that have a non-trivial chance of
failing. In this subsection, we consider these two reasons for why the interbank market might
have been willing to lend to the LTCM banks, even if their risk of failing had risen significantly.
We first consider the possibility that although the market as a whole did not ration the
LTCM banks, part of the market may have done so. Suppose that only some segment of the
interbank market was sufficiently knowledgeable about the troubled hedge fund and began to
ration credit to the LTCM banks. The data would still show no rationing if the LTCM banks
responded by shifting their borrowing to other, less sophisticated sources. To investigate this
possibility, we look at the type of institution that was lending money to the LTCM creditors
during the crisis period. Institutions were allocated to four categories: creditors of LTCM,
“sophisticated” institutions, “unsophisticated” institutions, and all other institutions. Institutions
were defined as “sophisticated” if they were not creditors of LTCM, but were either Big or20
LCBOs, where these variables were defined as before.
16 “Unsophisticated” institutions comprise
financial institutions that were neither large nor complex and also quasi-government
organizations such as the federal home loan banks and the federal mortgage agencies. For each
date, each bank’s share of overnight lending coming from each of these lender categories was
constructed. These four share variables served as the dependent variable in the four regression
equations given by (2).









= + + + + =   
== = =






iq q cit ε φ ω δ α
For example, the first regression uses the share of bank i’s overnight borrowing on date t from
LTCM creditors (c=1) as the dependent variable. This share is regressed on a constant, dummy
variables indicating whether bank i is either an LTCM creditor (q=1), a Big bank (q=2), or a
large, complex banking organization (q=3), and these indicators interacted with the four crisis
subperiods used earlier. The second, third, and fourth regressions are identical, but replace the
dependent variables with the share of bank i’s borrowing on date t from sophisticated (c=2),
unsophisticated (c=3), and other (c=4) institutions, respectively. Each regression also controls
for the possibility that the overall source of funds in this market may be changing by including
variables measuring the share of the overall market supplied by the LTCM banks (d=1), Big
banks that were not LTCM (d=2), and LCBOs that were not LTCM or Big (d=3).
17 To focus
attention on the final subperiod, Table 3 reports the estimates for subperiod 5, which again
represents the time after the Fed became involved but before the resolution was announced. After
controlling for changes in the market’s source of funds, the results indicate that LTCM creditors
                                                     
16 Note that, unlike in the earlier analysis, the categories used here are defined to be mutually exclusive. In
particular, the LTCM creditors are not part of the “sophisticated” group.
17 The results are similar when the share variables (d=1, …, 3) are omitted.21
borrowed less from other LTCM creditors during this time.
18 There is not a statistically
significant increase in the share of borrowing done by the LTCM creditors from either
sophisticated or unsophisticated institutions. Thus, these results do not indicate that the LTCM
banks were borrowing more from the relatively uninformed institutions immediately before the
resolution.
We now consider whether the LTCM banks were not rationed because the market believed
that these major institutions were too-big-to-fail. That is, lenders of overnight money may have
believed that although the LTCM creditor banks had a significant probability of defaulting on
their interbank borrowing in the absence of intervention, policymakers would most likely not let
this happen. To investigate this possibility, Table 4 reports the increase in the interest rate
premium that a risk neutral lender would require to compensate itself for an increase in overnight
default risk of various magnitudes as a function of the probability that the borrower is too-big-to-
fail assuming that federal funds lenders would suffer a 100% loss in the event of the failure of its
counterparty. For example, Table 4 indicates that a bank whose overnight default probability has
increased by 1 in 100,000 will see its risk premium rise by 36 basis points for unsecured
borrowing if it has no chance of being considered TBTF. The increase in the required risk
premium is also 36 basis points when the borrower’s failure probability increases by 1 in 50,000
if there is a 50% chance that the borrower will be deemed TBTF. Thus, from the perspective of a
lending institution, higher overnight default probabilities of a borrower are directly offset by
higher probabilities of the borrower being considered TBTF. Clearly, if a borrowing institution is
definitely too-big-to-fail, then there would be no need for a risk premium, much less any
rationing.
                                                     
18 Because the LTCM creditors were collectively trying to reduce their net borrowing, they would not be expected to22
The last three columns of Table 4 indicate the required likelihood of a TBTF rescue that is
implicit in a bank’s continued willingness to lend money for various increases in overnight
default probability. The columns differ with respect to the assumptions regarding how much risk
premiums can increase before rationing sets in and the loss to the federal funds lender in the
event of the failure of its counterparty. As argued earlier, it may be reasonable to assume that the
LTCM banks would not pay more than an additional 25 basis points for fear of conveying to the
market that something out of the ordinary was happening. With this assumption, and a 100% loss
given default, a lender would have to be more than 86% sure that the borrower is too-big-to-fail
before being willing to lend if the overnight probability of default increases by one chance in
20,000. The results in the final column of Table 4 indicate that even if risk premiums could rise
by 50 basis points and a federal funds lender would lose only 50% of its principal in the event of
counterparty failure, lenders would still need to be over 72% confident of a too-big-to-fail rescue
in order to continue to lend to an institution that suffers an increase in overnight failure
probability of 1 in 10,000. Thus, Table 4 indicates that even under fairly conservative
assumptions, lenders would have needed to be reasonably sure that the LTCM banks were TBTF
to be willing to continue to extend funds, even if these banks’ overnight default probability had
risen by only one chance in 10,000.
Deciding whether markets should have reasonably expected such a high probability of a
TBTF rescue is difficult given that there have been no major bank failures in the United States
since the passage of the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. As Wall (1993) describes,
FDICIA requires policymakers to resolve a failing organization according to the least costly
method of resolution. By definition, this would preclude the complete protection of unsecured
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interbank creditors. Nevertheless, Wall (1993) describes FDICIA’s “systemic risk exception”
clause, which allows unsecured creditors of a failing institution to be protected if failure to do so
would “have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability” (Wall (1993),
p. 1). Although this clause in FDICIA does allow some potential for TBTF to survive, it seems
reasonable to suggest that markets should have been far from certain that such a policy would
have been applied to the LTCM creditors. In support of this claim, Benston and Kaufman (1998)
find that uninsured depositors at failing US banks have been protected noticeably less since
FDICIA. Further, they note that the Bank of England did not fully protect uninsured depositors
following the collapse of both BCCI and Barings even though it had pursued a TBTF policy
earlier. Given this likely uncertainty surrounding a TBTF rescue, the failure of rationing to
materialize suggests that the interbank market believed that the risk that the LTCM banks would
default remained small.
5.4 Interpretation
The previous results indicate that the lower levels of borrowing by the LTCM creditors
relative to other large banks in the days before the resolution represented a voluntary action by
these institutions. Thus, the market did not perceive that the LTCM banks were in imminent
danger of failing. Nevertheless, the behavior of these nine institutions was atypical. In particular,
in the days immediately preceding the resolution, these banks chose to increase the level of funds
sold at a cost of nearly 5 basis points. In conjunction with their borrowing activity, this action
noticeably reduced the banks’ net level of overnight borrowing that would be able to fund other
investment activities. One interpretation of this is that after the Fed became involved, the LTCM
creditors sought to reduce their investments in risky short-term activities (e.g. trading positions),
and instead placed more in the relatively safe investment of lending in the funds market (to non-24
LTCM-exposed counterparties). An alternative and possibly complementary interpretation of the
reduction in net borrowing by the LTCM banks was a desire to temporarily hold more liquid
assets. Given the unrest in securities markets during this time period, a shift from holding
securities in a trading book to lending more in the funds market may have been a logical way to
achieve this goal.
Regardless of whether the LTCM banks’ actions were an attempt to reduce risks, increase
liquidity, or both, the results indicate that the change in behavior occurred only during the period
after the Fed became involved. One explanation of this timing is that Fed involvement might
have conveyed new information to the nine creditors that the problems at LTCM were more
serious and could cause greater losses than previously thought. A natural response to this new
information might have been for the banks to reduce risk-taking and increase the liquidity of
their short-term investments. The Fed’s involvement also conveyed the fact that the Fed would
not use public money to assist in any creditor bailout of LTCM. This, too, might have led
institutions that had expected public support to act in this way.
6. Evidence from after the resolution
Some argue that the Fed’s role in the resolution of LTCM was to solve a coordination
problem among a diverse group of creditors. Interpreted in this light, the Fed’s action can be
viewed as an ex post improvement to bankruptcy procedures. However, interpreting the Fed’s
action in this way suggests that not all institutions should expect to benefit from such improved
bankruptcy procedures in the future. In particular, the Fed’s action might be seen as increasing
the protection given to major financial institutions because it is these institutions that are most25
likely to later benefit from similar Fed action. In this way, selective intervention might be viewed
as analogous to a more traditional TBTF policy.
In this section, we examine whether the Fed’s decision to facilitate an orderly resolution
may have changed the market’s perception of the protection against adverse events given to
select institutions. Such changes in protection would alter the perceived probability of a major
institution failing, and thus should be reflected in the risk premiums paid for unsecured funds.
Thus, this section explores whether, after the LTCM resolution, there was any reduction in the
interest rates paid to borrow unsecured, overnight funds by the set of institutions most likely to
benefit from an implicit extension of a too-big-to-fail policy. Recall that since this is an implicit
test of the existence of small changes to small probabilities, it is appropriate to focus on interest
rates paid.
The analysis will be based on a comparison of interest rates charged during the last period
of 1998 (from September 24 to December 31) to those charged during the baseline period
(January 1 to June 30).
19 Table 5 reports the estimates from regressions analogous to those run
earlier. The first column indicates that whereas the LTCM creditor institutions saw the rates that
they pay on overnight funds increase by 3.82 basis points (relative to other very large
institutions), the large, complex banking organizations began attracting funds at a rate 4.20 basis
points lower.
These results could be driven by two possibilities. First, the LTCM banks could have
increased the amount they were borrowing and therefore driven up the rate they needed to pay.
Second, the interbank market could have increased the rate that it requires in order to lend any
given amount to the LTCM banks. That is, it is necessary to determine whether the higher26
interest rates paid for funds by the LTCM banks were a result of different market treatment (i.e.
supply-induced) or a result of a change in the behavior of the LTCM banks themselves (i.e.
demand-induced). The results in Table 5 for borrowing and lending during this period document
that the LTCM creditors did not change their level of borrowing. Combined with the fact that
very large banks, in general, were reducing their borrowing, this suggests that the market was
demanding a premium to lend to the LTCM banks. By contrast, the large, complex banking
organizations were increasing their borrowing during this period, yet paying a lower rate of
interest. This, in turn, is consistent with an increase in the market’s willingness to extend funds
to these institutions.
20
Overall, the empirical results for the time after the resolution suggest that the market may
have perceived that LTCM creditors were riskier than before. This increase in perceived risk
could reflect a reduction in perceived TBTF benefits (i.e. a more substantial public bailout had
been expected). Alternatively, higher interest rate spreads paid by the LTCM creditors after the
resolution may simply reflect the fact that the market, having witnessed an extraordinary crisis
resolution, now views these banks as riskier than was earlier perceived because they became
overly exposed to a single institution. The opposite conclusions apply to the large, complex
banking organizations. First, the market may have perceived that these institutions are marginally
safer following the LTCM resolution, perhaps because these institutions were wise enough not to
become involved with whatever activities would have exposed them to the troubles at LTCM.
Alternatively, the finding that these institutions began paying lower rates for unsecured
                                                                                                                                                                          
19 The results that follow are robust to the beginning of the “post-crisis” period after the Fed’s inter-meeting cut on
October 15.
20 Very large banks that were not LTCM creditors also witnessed a decline in their risk premiums of nearly 2 basis
points (significant at the 7% level). However, as these institutions were simultaneously reducing their borrowing, the
change in interest rates paid may have been demand-driven.27
borrowing could reflect the market’s view that a TBTF policy has been extended. In interpreting
these results, it is important to recall that a widening of the difference between the spreads paid
by the LTCM creditors and complex banks of approximately 8 basis points is quite substantial,
given that these institutions had previously paid similar premiums.
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided two key empirical results regarding the events surrounding the
resolution of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. First, participants in the federal
funds market did not restrict their borrowing to the nine major creditors of LTCM. The observed
decrease in borrowing done by these nine banks was accompanied by an increase in their
interbank lending, suggesting that the resulting decline in net borrowing was by choice. Further,
there was no apparent shift towards borrowing from less knowledgeable institutions. Numerical
estimates suggest that a perception of too-big-to-fail also seems unlikely to be the driving force
behind this result. These findings suggest that the market never believed that these major
institutions had a significant probability of default.
The second major result of the paper is the finding that large, complex banking
organizations began paying lower interest rates for unsecured overnight money following the
resolution of the LTCM crisis. One possibility is that markets viewed these institutions as safer
because they avoided the difficulties related to the troubled hedge fund. Alternatively, this result
suggests that the Fed’s action, even though it provided no public money, may have been
perceived in the market as an implicit extension of a too-big-to-fail policy.
Ultimately, these findings cannot lead one to conclude whether the Fed should have
intervened in the way in which it did because the benefits and costs of Fed action are neither28
measured in their entirety nor weighted by an appropriate social welfare function. Nevertheless,
the results suggest that the benefits of Fed intervention may have been lower and the costs higher
than perceived at the time.
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Table 1: Borrowing and lending in the federal funds market
Entries in the table represent averages of daily figures using only observations from banks that borrowed on a
given day. The sample period for these statistics is January-June 1998. Values are expressed in millions of




LTCM creditor Big or complex but
not LTCM creditor




M i n i m u m 1 111
Median 3,934 703 111 10
Maximum 29,940 22,390 6,516 4,150
Mean 5,673 1,340 369 53
Standard deviation 6,010 2,220 671 176
Number of institutions 9 42 113 489
Gross lending
Category of institution
LTCM creditor Big or complex but
not LTCM creditor




M i n i m u m 1 111
Median 1,029 255 108 30
Maximum 23,550 19,370 6,056 1,045
Mean 4,701 903 321 215
Standard deviation 6,000 2,140 532 592
Number of institutions 9 41 105 427
Net borrowing
Category of institution
LTCM creditor Big or complex but
not LTCM creditor




Minimum -18,700 -18,970 -4,448 -10,450
Median 1,857 366 46 -15
Maximum 22,000 18,690 6,512 3,460
Mean 1,239 590 170 -159
Standard deviation 6,400 2,500 741 540
Number of institutions 9 42 113 48931
Table 2: Borrowing and lending in the federal funds market prior to the resolution of LTCM
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Dependent variable ( it y )
Gross borrowing
( it zb )
Gross lending
( it zs )
Net borrowing










Constant term 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.29
(0.24)**
19980700<=date<=19980816 -0.02 0.33 -0.12 -0.55 -2.77
(0.03) (0.05)** (0.03)** (0.23)* (0.45)**
19980817<=date<=19980901 0.04 0.36 -0.12 0.68 -2.25
(0.05) (0.10)** (0.05)* (0.27)* (0.67)**
19980902<=date<=19980917 0.04 0.94 -0.21 2.76 -0.61
(0.05) (0.22)** (0.05)** (0.32)** (0.68)
19980918<=date<=19980923 0.29 0.19 0.15 2.35 4.33
(0.10)** (0.09)* (0.09) (0.39)** (0.88)**
Borrower is a creditor of LTCM
LTCM dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09
(1.19)
19980700<=date<=19980816 0.05 -0.16 0.08 0.90 0.53
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.86) (1.65)
19980817<=date<=19980901 -0.19 0.03 -0.21 0.17 -2.28
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.80) (2.14)
19980902<=date<=19980917 0.08 -0.15 0.14 0.87 -0.52
(0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (1.12) (2.45)
19980918<=date<=19980923 -0.42 0.66 -0.61 -0.97 -4.56
(0.29) (0.32)* (0.31)* (1.97) (2.39)
Borrower is as big as the smallest LTCM creditor
Big dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.03
(1.02)**
19980700<=date<=19980816 0.04 -0.33 0.15 -0.54 1.68
(0.06) (0.08)** (0.06)* (0.45) (1.32)
19980817<=date<=19980901 -0.07 -0.30 0.08 -0.92 0.72
(0.11) (0.12)* (0.11) (0.63) (1.65)
19980902<=date<=19980917 0.09 -0.48 0.06 -1.00 -1.85
(0.14) (0.24)* (0.14) (0.86) (1.75)
19980918<=date<=19980923 0.53 -0.08 0.39 1.87 -1.17
(0.24)* (0.19) (0.24) (1.30) (2.17)32
Borrower is a large, complex banking organization
LCBO dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.93
(0.41)**
19980700<=date<=19980816 0.29 0.08 0.17 -1.03 0.36
(0.04)** (0.06) (0.05)** (0.37)** (0.75)
19980817<=date<=19980901 0.40 0.13 0.20 -1.11 1.34
(0.08)** (0.12) (0.08)* (0.45)* (1.13)
19980902<=date<=19980917 0.28 -0.32 0.24 -1.13 1.53
(0.10)** (0.20) (0.09)** (0.54)* (1.07)
19980918<=date<=19980923 0.04 0.33 -0.14 -0.06 -0.28
(0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.62) (1.41)
Borrower is a German bank
German dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.51
(1.25)**
19980700<=date<=19980816 0.11 -0.01 0.11 -0.52 0.91
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.73) (1.72)
19980817<=date<=19980901 0.46 -0.17 0.41 -0.53 -2.30
(0.22)* (0.11) (0.17)* (0.99) (2.55)
19980902<=date<=19980917 0.84 -0.71 0.98 3.18 -3.42
(0.22)** (0.14)** (0.19)** (1.18)** (3.13)
19980918<=date<=19980923 -0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.21 -0.60
(0.36) (0.23) (0.29) (1.90) (2.68)
The bank’s typical interest rate spread paid
Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.24
(0.03)**
19980700<=date<=19980816 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.03
(0.00)** (0.00)* (0.00) (0.03)* (0.05)
19980817<=date<=19980901 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 0.03
(0.00)** (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.05)** (0.07)
19980902<=date<=19980917 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 0.07
(0.01)** (0.01)* (0.00)** (0.05)** (0.07)
19980918<=date<=19980923 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.05
(0.01)** (0.01) (0.01)** (0.12) (0.09)
Observations 30,340 27,935 30,340 28,935 28,121
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The normal period is 19980101 to 19980630. Numbers in italics are equal to shown value by construction.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.33
Table 3: Classification of lender identity at peak of crisis
(only estimates from 19980918<=date<=19980923 reported)
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Dependent variable:






Borrower is a creditor of LTCM -7.01 4.15 3.28
(2.43)** (3.04) (2.85)
Borrower is as big as the smallest LTCM







Borrower is a large, complex banking







Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.34
Table 4: Implied risk premiums as a function of default
probabilities and strength of too-big-to-fail
(in basis points, assuming 100% loss given default)
Probability of TBTF required to
continue lending when risk premiums



















points 0 25% 50% 75% 95% 100%
1 in
100,000 0.10 36 27 18 9 1.8 0 0.305556 0 0
1 in
50,000 0.20 72 54 36 18 3.6 0 0.652778 0.305556 0
1 in
20,000 0.50 180 135 90 45 9 0 0.861111 0.722222 0.444444
1 in
13,333 0.75 270 202.5 135 67.5 13.5 0 0.907407 0.814815 0.62963
1 in
10,000 1.00 360 270 180 90 18 0 0.930556 0.861111 0.72222235
Table 5: Borrowing and lending in the federal funds market after the resolution of LTCM
Estimated from the regression equation  it in
n
t n i t
n



















( it zb )
Gross lending
( it zs )
Net borrowing
( it zn )
Time period dummies
19980924<=date<=19981231 7.39 25.55 0.24 0.49 -0.05
(0.33)** (0.57)** (0.03)** (0.05)** (0.03)
Borrower is a creditor of LTCM
19980924<=date<=19981231 3.82 0.62 -0.08 1.38 -0.40
(1.64)* (2.10) (0.10) (0.24)** (0.11)**
Borrower is as big as the smallest LTCM creditor
19980924<=date<=19981231 -1.88 -21.44 -0.25 -0.01 -0.14
(1.01) (1.63)** (0.08)** (0.07) (0.07)*
Borrower is a large, complex banking organization
19980924<=date<=19981231 -4.20 -6.37 0.51 0.74 0.13
(0.60)** (0.98)** (0.05)** (0.09)** (0.05)*
Borrower is a German bank
19980924<=date<=19981231 6.87 7.39 3.08 -0.67 2.62
(1.45)** (2.97)* (0.22)** (0.09)** (0.17)**
The bank’s typical interest rate spread paid
19980924<=date<=19981231 0.01 0.21 -0.03 0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)** (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.00)**
Observations 28,969 28,979 31,488 28,992 31,488
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The baseline period (omitted categories) is 19980101 to 19980630.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.36





























LTCM Big or complex Active AllSummary
The events surrounding the trouble experienced by Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
and its eventual rescue were portrayed, as they were happening, as a serious threat to the health of the
US economy. As is well known, the Federal Reserve played a key role in organizing and hosting
meetings between LTCM and the institutions that would ultimately rescue the troubled hedge fund.
After the fact, it is difficult to determine whether or not the Fed’s decision to intervene was a good
one because one can only directly observe the benefits of the action (orderly resolution and no major
bank failures) but not the costs. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to provide some evidence on the
magnitude of the benefits and costs of the Fed’s action. 
To shed light on the magnitude of the benefits of Fed involvement, the paper examines the
level of unsecured overnight borrowing done by these nine institutions as an indication of whether
the market believed that these banks had a significant risk of insolvency during September 1998. The
paper finds that the nine large commercial bank counterparties to LTCM reduced their borrowing of
overnight, unsecured funds during the last days of the crisis period. However, it is shown that this
reduction was accompanied by an increase in the gross level of overnight lending done by these same
institutions. These two findings jointly suggest that the nine banks were voluntarily reducing their net
borrowing of overnight funds rather than being rationed from the market. The lack of rationing, in
turn, implies that market participants were not overly worried about the solvency of these
institutions.
To consider the potential costs of Fed involvement, we look for evidence that might suggest
that the safety net was expanded by the Fed’s involvement with LTCM. For example, if the market
interpreted Fed intervention as a strengthening of an implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy, then one
might expect large banks that were not creditors of LTCM to have been viewed as an implicitly safer
counterparty after the resolution relative to before the crisis. The paper finds that large and complex
US commercial banks that were not exposed to LTCM paid lower interest rates to borrow overnight,
unsecured money after the hedge fund’s rescue than they did before the crisis began to unfold. One
interpretation of this finding is that the market has viewed the Fed’s action as an enhancement of
TBTF. 
Ultimately, these findings cannot lead one to conclude whether the Fed should have intervened
in the way in which it did because the benefits and costs of Fed action are neither measured in their
entirety nor weighted by an appropriate social welfare function. Nevertheless, the results suggest that
the benefits of Fed intervention may have been lower and the costs higher than perceived at the time.